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Under what circumstances do programmes of
fiscal stimulus and fiscal austerity have a
significant impact on the level of national
economic activity? To address this question,
Ethan Ilzetzki and colleagues have 
assembled a new database on government
spending and GDP in 20 high-income countries











lowering taxes) in an effort to boost
demand and bring their economies out of
recession. In such circumstances, one
might have expected a certain degree of
consensus within the economics
profession on the effectiveness of fiscal
policy. But nothing could be farther 
from the truth.
In a January 2009 piece in the Wall
Street Journal, Robert Barro argued that
the peacetime ‘fiscal multiplier’ – the
dollar increase in GDP caused by a one
dollar increase in government spending –
is essentially zero. At the other extreme,
Christina Romer, chair of President
Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers,
used multipliers as high as 1.6 in
estimating the job gains that will be
generated by the $787 billion stimulus
package approved by the US Congress in
February 2009. The difference between
the Barro and Romer views of the world
amounts to a staggering 3.7 million jobs
by the end of 2010.
There have been similar rifts in the UK.
In duelling letters to the Times and the
Financial Times, professors from the LSE
and other universities were divided on
whether immediate action was required to
reduce fiscal deficits or whether fiscal
consolidation would deepen the UK’s
recession.
The main cause of these differences is
the limited and often conflicting evidence
on the effects of fiscal policy on economic
activity. One of the biggest hurdles to
obtaining precise and consistent estimates
of fiscal multipliers has been data
availability. Most studies have relied on
evidence from a small number of
countries, typically the United States.
Existing evidence also shows very different
effects across time and countries.
For example, in a 2004 study, Roberto
Perotti estimated that the multiplier on
government expenditures might range
from as low as minus 2.3 to as high as
3.7, depending on the country and time
period studied. Even within countries he
found enormous variance. For the UK, for
example, he found that the government
expenditure multiplier declined from 0.1 in
1960-79 to minus 1.2 in 1980-2001.
To address the shortcomings of
existing evidence, we have collected 
a quarterly dataset for 44 countries (20
high-income countries and 24 developing
countries). These data have recently
become available thanks to improvements
in the data collection capacity of statistical
agencies in a number of developing
countries, and the adoption of a common
statistical standard for collecting fiscal data
in the European Union.
Using this new dataset, we are able to
estimate the effects of government
purchases on GDP with a number of
observations ten times larger than earlier
studies. And by grouping countries with
similar characteristics together, we can
derive estimates of the fiscal multiplier
that are significantly more accurate than in
studies that use data from a single
country.
Moreover, this is the first study of the
impact of fiscal policy using high-
frequency data for a broad sample of
developing countries. With data covering
countries at different stages of economic
development and differing in other
characteristics, we are able to determine
not only whether fiscal policy is likely to
be effective as a countercyclical
stabilisation tool, but also where and
when.
Given the novelty of studying the
effects of fiscal policy at business cycle
frequency in developing countries, the
natural first question is whether fiscal
policy has similar effects in developing and
high-income countries. Striking differences
emerge.
In high-income countries, an increase
in government consumption equivalent to
1% of GDP causes an immediate increase
in GDP of four tenths of 1%, implying a
fiscal multiplier of 0.4. This implies a
significant degree of ‘crowding out’ of
Expansionary government
spending has a smaller and less
persistent effect on output in
developing countries than in
high-income countries
The size of the fiscal
multiplier critically depends
on key characteristics of the
economy, including its
monetary regime and
openness to tradeprivate economic activity by fiscal
expansions. In other words, government
economic activity is to some extent
discouraging private sector efforts to do
the same thing.
But government purchases do not fully
crowd out the private sector. In the long
run – accounting for the cumulative
impact of government purchases on GDP
until their effects die out – our estimate of
the multiplier increases to 0.8. This still
implies some crowding out – and it
reaffirms the conjecture (often associated
with Milton Friedman) that fiscal policy is
unlikely to have a stimulative effect except
after significant delay. 
The results in developing countries are
very different. The fiscal multiplier is minus
0.2, meaning that fiscal stimulus more
than fully crowds out private activity, and
GDP will tend to decline in response to an
increase in government spending. Thus
expansions in government consumption
have a negative impact on GDP in
developing countries.
But another striking difference
between high-income countries and
developing countries is in fiscal policies
themselves. While increases in government
spending are persistent in high-income
countries, with expenditures remaining
above trend for as long as six years, these
increases are very short-lived in developing
countries, frequently followed by reversals
(with expenditures declining to below
trend) after one to two years. 
The textbook macroeconomic model
for economies open to trade in goods and
capital (the Mundell-Fleming model)
predicts that fiscal policy has very different
effects depending on a country’s monetary
arrangements. While we would expect
increases in government expenditures to
cause substantial increases in GDP where
the monetary authority pegs the value of
its currency (a fixed exchange rate regime),
their effects should be much smaller in
countries with flexible exchange
arrangements. Surprisingly, little evidence
in support of this theory has been
reported to date.
With data covering countries under
both monetary regimes, and even
countries that have changed their
monetary arrangements over time, we
provide strong evidence in favour of the
importance of the exchange rate regime
for the fiscal multiplier. As Figure 1 shows,
the long-run fiscal multiplier is large
(approximately 1.5) in countries with fixed
exchange rates; in contrast, in countries
with flexible exchange arrangements, the
long-run multiplier is essentially zero.
We find a similar result when
contrasting countries for which trade
comprises only a small part of economic
activity (where we find long-run fiscal
multipliers of 1.4) and those highly
exposed to international trade (with
multipliers of approximately zero).
This may help to explain the significant
differences in the effects of fiscal policy
across countries and time periods found in
earlier studies. For example, the significant
decline in the expansionary power of
government purchases in the UK may be
explained by the fact that the pound was
pegged to the US dollar until the early
1970s, but allowed to float freely
thereafter. Moreover, international trade
has played an increasing role in the UK’s
CentrePiece Autumn 2010
10
The interaction between fiscal
and monetary policy is a crucial
determinant of the effects of
fiscal stimulus on GDP
Figure 1:
Cumulative multiplier: fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes
Solid lines show estimates of the cumulative fiscal multiplier at a given time horizon. 


















economic activity, with the ratio of trade
to GDP almost doubling since 1960. 
What explains these significant
differences across monetary
arrangements? According to the
Mundell-Fleming model, in countries with
flexible exchange rates, fiscal stimulus
causes an exchange rate appreciation,
which neutralises some of the stimulative
effect by leading to lower exports and
higher imports. But we find little
evidence for this phenomenon.
In contrast – but still consistent with
the textbook model – we find significant
differences in the responses of central
banks to fiscal stimulus, based on the
monetary regime. Central banks devoted
to maintaining a stable exchange rate
tend to lower interest rates (by an
average of 125 basis points) in response
to increases (of 1% of GDP) in
government consumption during the two
years following a fiscal stimulus. This
reinforces the fiscal stimulus and allows
for the large multipliers we estimate for
countries with this monetary regime.
Conversely, central banks with other
aims (such as an inflation target) increase
interest rates (by an average of 60 basis
points). They do so presumably to
counteract the inflationary pressures
caused by the fiscal expansion. This 
offsets the
stimulative impact of
fiscal policy and leads to the
negligible effects of fiscal stimulus for
countries with this monetary regime.
These results have important
implications for policy-makers. The
interaction between fiscal and monetary
policy is a crucial determinant of the
effects of fiscal stimulus. For example, it is
vital to consider the reaction of the Bank
of England in assessing the potential
economic fallout from the UK
government’s current austerity measures.
Should the Bank respond as inflation-
targeting central banks typically do, it will
attempt to contain the economic costs of
fiscal austerity through loose monetary
policy. On the other hand, with the
current Bank Rate at 0.5%, and the
unconventional programme of asset
purchases by the central bank already
standing at £200 billion, it is unclear
whether the Bank has the means to react
to fiscal austerity as it typically would.
Moreover, if inflation concerns force the
Bank to begin unwinding its loose
monetary policy, a coordinated fiscal-
monetary contraction could cause
significant economic pain.
The results of our study will certainly
not end the fiscal debate in the UK nor
elsewhere. Rather, they point to a broader
conclusion: that the size of the fiscal
multiplier critically depends on key
characteristics of the economy. When
considering large shifts in fiscal policy – be
it fiscal stimulus or fiscal austerity – it is
essential to look at the broader economic
environment confronting the government.
Drawing sweeping generalisations about
the impact of fiscal policy is probably an
exercise in futility.
This article summarises ‘How Big (Small?)
are Fiscal Multipliers?’ by Ethan Ilzetzki,
Enrique Mendoza and Carlos Végh, a
forthcoming CEP Discussion Paper.
Ethan Ilzetzki is a lecturer in LSE’s
economics department and a researcher in
CEP’s macroeconomics programme. Enrique
Mendoza and Carlos Végh are at the
University of Maryland.
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a rise in UK
interest rates, a
coordinated
fiscal-monetary
contraction could
cause significant
economic pain